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Abstract
Decoherence is widely felt to have something to do with the quantum
measurement problem, but getting clear on just what is made difficult by
the fact that the “measurement problem”, as traditionally presented in
foundational and philosophical discussions, has become somewhat discon-
nected from the conceptual problems posed by real physics. This, in turn,
is because quantum mechanics as discussed in textbooks and in founda-
tional discussions has become somewhat removed from scientific practice,
especially where the analysis of measurement is concerned.
This paper has two goals: firstly (sections 1–2), to present an account
of how quantum measurements are actually dealt with in modern physics
(hint: it doesn’t involve a collapse of the wavefunction) and to state the
measurement problem from the perspective of that account; and secondly
(sections 3–4), to clarify what role decoherence plays in modern measure-
ment theory and what effect it has on the various strategies that have
been proposed to solve the measurement problem.
1 The myth of the “conventional interpretation”
Foundational discussions of quantum theory have a tendency to talk about the
“conventional” or “orthodox” or “standard” interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. It’s not generally very clear what’s meant by this, but a rough stab might
be that it consists of these two principles:
1. (the Measurement Algorithm) Observable quantities are represented by
self-adjoint operators; the possible outcomes of a measurement of some
observable are the eigenvalues of the associated operator; the probability
of a given measurement outcome obtaining is given by the usual (Born)
probability rule.
2. (the Projection Postulate) While in the absence of measurement a sys-
tem evolves unitarily and deterministically, according to the Schro¨dinger
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equation, when a measurement is made the system evolves stochastically,
with its state vector being projected onto the eigensubspace corresponding
to the actual measurement outcome. As such, the dynamics of quantum
theory have a dual nature, with one evolution rule for non-measurement
situations and one for measurement situations.
Often (including by Dirac (1930)), the second is derived from the first by con-
sideration of repeat measurements: presumably (so goes the reasoning) two
measurements in succession had better give the same result, and this can only
be guaranteed if the Projection Postulate holds.
It’s generally held that this “conventional interpretation´’ is profoundly un-
satisfactory conceptually and philosophically, essentially because it treats “mea-
surement” as a primitive term. Measurement, so the argument goes, is a physical
process like any other, so (i) our theory should not contain assumptions which
can be stated only by treating measurement as some primitive process, and (ii)
whether a quantum system evolves according to one rule or another should not
depend on whether we classify a physical process as a “measurement” or not.
My concern, however, isn’t what makes the orthodox interpretation unsat-
isfactory; it’s what makes it orthodox. To be sure: the orthodox interpretation
is pretty much what we find in von Neumann’s (1955) and Dirac’s (1930) orig-
inal presentations of the subject. To be sure: it’s pretty much what we find
in most textbooks on quantum mechanics.1 And to be sure: it’s pretty much
what we find in most discussions of the quantum measurement problem. But
it’s not something which we actually find in use, much or at all, in mainstream
applications of quantum theory.
We can see this pretty straightforwardly in the case of the Projection Postu-
late. The postulate tells us how a quantum system evolves during measurement,
and this tells us immediately that it can only play a role in applications of quan-
tum physics in situations where we want to analyse repeated measurements. If
all we care about is the outcome of single measurements, the Measurement
Algorithm tells us all we need to know.
But if the point of the Projection Postulate is to analyse repeated measure-
ments, there’s an embarrassing problem: the Postulate tells us successive mea-
surements of the same quantity always give the same result, and this is straight-
forwardly false in many — perhaps most — experimental contexts. (We can see
this particularly dramatically in quantum optics: when we make a measurement
of a photon, the photon is typically gone at the end of the measurement.)2
The case of continuous measurements (like those performed by a Geiger
counter) also demonstrates that the Projection Postulate is unacceptable as
an analysis of quantum dynamics during the measurement process. The only
way to analyse continuous measurements via the Postulate would be to treat it
1See, for instance, Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu, and Laloe¨ (1977), Landau and Lifshitz (1977),
Rae (1992), and Sakurai (1994); Ballentine (1990) is an interesting exception.
2Bell and Nauenberg (1966) pointed this out some while ago, and introduced a distinc-
tion between “moral” measurements which are compatible with the projection postulate, and
“immoral” measurements, which aren’t; see Home and Whitaker (1997) for further discussion.
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as the limiting case of increasingly frequent measurements. But the quantum
Zeno effect (Misra and Sudarshan (1977); see Home and Whitaker (1997) for
discussion) tells us that the result of any such limiting-case measurement is
to freeze the system’s evolution altogether, in flat contradiction of observed
fact. (This was the original reason that Misra and Sudarshan, who did analyse
continuous measurement in exactly this way, called the quantum Zeno effect a
‘paradox’.)
So if the only way the Projection Postulate could figure into the practice of
physics is via the case of repeated measurements, and if it is patently unaccept-
able for that task, then there can be no practical role for the Postulate in physics.
And for what it’s worth, crude sociological measures seem to back this up: a
search for “projection postulate”, “wave-function collapse” and the like in the
archives of Physical Review turns up only a few hundred references, nearly all
of which turn out to be (a) foundational discussions, (b) discussions of proposed
alternatives to quantum theory, or (c) theoretical quantum-computation discus-
sions, where “measurement” does indeed get treated as primitive. (For compar-
ison, searches for terms like “state vector” or “Hilbert space” or “Schrodinger
equation” typically turn up several tens of thousands of references.) It’s also
notable that in relativistic quantum mechanics, even defining the Projection
Postulate is a delicate matter, because of relativity of simultaneity. One might
then expect that textbooks on quantum field theory would need to address this
point, but no such textbook of which I am aware does so; we can infer that
the Projection Postulate is not much missed by practicing particle physicists or
quantum field theorists.
However, I do not wish to suggest that we have no effective way to analyse
the process of repeated measurement. Actually, we can analyse it just fine
(where here “just fine” means “just fine if our goal is getting the empirically
observed answer”, not necessarily “just fine conceptually speaking”.) Doing so,
though, requires us to drop the idea that measurement, as conceived in the
Measurement Algorithm, is a primitive process.
This should have been obvious in any case. Treating “measurement” as a
primitive term is not just philosophically unsatisfactory: it’s a non-starter if you
actually want to build and use a measurement device. And since we do actually
build and use measurement devices, we can’t just be treating measurement
processes as primitive!
To expand: textbook and foundational discussions of quantum mechanics of-
ten give the impression that measurement devices are inexplicable black boxes
which we find scattered across the desert, each one stamped with a self-adjoint
operator and equipped with a funnel to insert quantum systems and a dial dis-
playing the outcomes. But of course, real measurement devices are designed very
carefully by experimental physicists. It’s not a primitive feature of them that
they measure whatever it is that they measure: it’s a deliberate design feature.
Perhaps at one time that design proceeded by handwaving appeals to quantum-
classical correspondence, but in modern experimental physics the design of a
quantum-mechanical measurement device relies extensively on quantum theory
itself.
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How can this be done? The answer, pretty much invariably, is that we apply
quantum theory — unitary quantum theory, with no Projection Postulate —
to the measurement process itself, and then apply the Measurement Algorithm
to the combined system of original-system-plus-measuring-device. This might
seem like an infinite regress — doesn’t applying the Algorithm presuppose yet
one more measurement? — but in practice the regress can be ended when the
system is macroscopically large, so that we can treat its macroscopic features —
say, its centre-of-mass position or momentum — as straightforwardly observable
properties.
In the particular case of repeated measurements, a multiply-conducted mea-
surement will need multiple readout displays. The measurement algorithm, ap-
plied to the combined original-system-plus-apparatus quantum system, delivers
a determinate probability prediction over those displays. In some situations, it
predicts that the displays are perfectly correlated; in these situations, we could
have got away with using the Projection Postulate. In most situations, the cor-
relation will be either imperfect or absent altogether. Similarly, in the case of
continuous measurements, analysing the actual measurement dynamics — using
unitary quantum mechanics — and then applying the Measurement Algorithm
will give us the probability of a decay (say) being registered as a function of
time (and will, in general, tell us that the decay rate is not especially sensitive
to how closely the system is monitored, except in extreme cases).
We are left with an understanding of the measurement problem that is a
better fit to contemporary scientific practice. There is no conventional interpre-
tation of quantum theory. What there is, is the formalism of unitary quantum
theory, shorn of any interpretation. We go from quantum theory to empirical
predictions, not by understanding unitary quantum theory as a description of
physical reality, but by applying a Measurement Algorithm, in principle at the
level of microphysics but, when pushed, ultimately at the level of macroscopic,
straightforwardly observable, facts. But that Algorithm (a) seems ill-defined
and shot through with terms that don’t belong in fundamental physics (“macro-
scopic” and “straightforwardly observable” are only slightly more satisfactory
than “measurement” as primitives), (b) relatedly, runs into the problem that
even macroscopic observation processes are just more physical processes, and so
shouldn’t have special status, and (c) seems to block any attempt to understand
quantum theory as a theory which tells us about Nature, and not just about
what the dials and computer screens in our lab are going to do in any given
situation.
From this point of view, it’s also reasonably clear what would count as solv-
ing the problem. We either need to find some way of understanding unitary
quantum theory so that it can give experimental predictions directly and not
via the unsatisfactory Measurement Algorithm — or we need to modify or sup-
plement unitary quantum theory so as to obtain a new theory which does not
need the Measurement Algorithm.
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2 Two concepts of state space
The account of the previous section may look unfamiliar. Normally (at least
in foundational and philosophical discussions) the argument for a measurement
problem is more direct: unitary quantum theory predicts macroscopic super-
positions, which aren’t observed, so unitary quantum theory must fail when
applied to macroscopic systems (and presumably something like a Projection
Postulate must be applied, albeit perhaps at the macroscopic level rather than
for microscopic systems).
The basic assumption here is that Schro¨dinger-cat states like
α |cat alive〉+ β |cat dead〉 (1)
have to be understood as somehow describing a cat in an indefinite state of
aliveness — a cat that somehow is alive and dead at the same time. But why
are we required to think this way?
In the philosophy literature, this reading of (1) is often justified by appeal
to the so-called
Eigenvalue-eigenvector link (E-E link): A quantum system possesses a def-
inite value of an observable if and only if its state is an eigenstate of the
associated operator; if so, the definite possessed value is the eigenvalue
associated with that eigenstate.
According to the E-E link, the state I wrote schematically as |cat alive〉 can be
understood as a state of a live cat because it lies in some subspace of the cat’s
Hilbert space corresponding to the “aliveness=1” subspace of the “aliveness
operator”; similarly, the state |cat dead〉 is in the “aliveness=0” subspace and
so is the state of a cat that is determinately not alive. The superposition of the
two, lying in neither subspace, represents a cat that is neither alive nor dead.
This argument should not worry us, though, because the E-E link has no
place in any serious discussion of the measurement problem. Like the Projection
Postulate, it plays basically no role in physical practice (searching Physical
Review’s archives for the phrase and its variants gives precisely two hits); unlike
the Projection Postulate, it seems to be purely an invention of philosophers,
which does not appear in any quantum physics textbook of which I am aware.
And this is not surprising, since in certain contexts it is fairly absurd, as can
be seen easily by considering measurements of position. No realistic quantum
wave-packet will remain in a bounded region of space for any non-zero length
of time, unless kept there by infinite (and hence unphysical) potentials: in
any physically realistic situation, some small section of the wavefunction will
tunnel to arbitrarily large distances, arbitrarily quickly. So realistic quantum
wavefunctions are spread right across space. Of course, macroscopic bodies can
have wavefunctions that are, and that remain, extremely small outside some
narrow region; wavefunctions like these are straightforwardly used in physics to
represent localised bodies. But the fact remains that no such state lies in the
eigenspace corresponding to any outcome of a position measurement, however
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coarse-grained.3 So according to the E-E link, all realistic quantum systems
have completely indefinite positions. If the E-E link were an inextricable part
of quantum physics, this would count as a reductio ad absurdum of quantum
theory; as it is, it just counts as a reductio ad absurdum of the E-E link.
So much for the E-E link. But even if that argument for the unacceptable
weirdness of Schro¨dinger-cat states does not go through, there might perfectly
well be other arguments to the same conclusion. To get more perspective on
states like (1), it helps to think a bit about the concept of a state space in
general.
The paradigm example of a state space is classical phase-space (I could tell
essentially the same story with configuration space). States — points in phase
space — represent the physical features of the system in question; different
points in phase space represent physically distinct systems. But this is not the
only kind of state space definable in classical physics: the space of probability
functions on phase space can also be treated as a state space (call it distribu-
tion space). Mathematically, phase space and distribution space are just two
sets of abstract mathematical objects with deterministic evolution equations:
Hamilton’s equations in the one case, Liouville’s equations in the other. The
central difference is conceptual: distinct points in distribution space do not rep-
resent systems in physically distinct states, but distinct probability distributions
over physical states. In other words, there are two conceptions of state space
available: physical, or probabilistic.4
One way to understand the difficulty of making sense of quantum states is
that we seem to shift between these two conceptions. When dealing with states
like 1 in practice, we treat them as probabilistic, conveying nothing more or
less than “the cat is either alive or dead, and it has chance |α|2 of being in the
first state, and |β|2 of being in the second”. On this reading of the quantum
state, there is nothing at all mysterious about (1), and no need to invoke the
Projection Postulate. Indeed, something like the Projection Postulate emerges
spontaneously from the ordinary calculus of probability: it is a commonplace
that probability distributions evolve both under the ordinary dynamics of the
system, and via probabilistic updating when we acquire more information. From
that perspective, the “collapse” of (1) onto either |alive cat〉 or |dead cat〉 upon
measurement is no more mysterious than the collapse of the classical probabil-
ity distribution “Heads with probability 1/2, tails with probability 1/2” onto
“Heads” or “Tails” upon measurement.
When dealing with the quantum states of microscopic systems, however, this
3In my view, failure to appreciate this point has caused much confusion in discussions of
the so-called “problem of tails” in the GRW dynamical-collapse theory (cf Wallace (2008) and
references therein): the “problem”, as generally discussed, has little to do with the GRW
theory per se, but is a general feature of quantum mechanics.
4An alternative terminology due to Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) calls the physical con-
ception ontic and the probabilistic conception epistemic. (In the case of the quantum state,
this becomes ‘ψ-ontic’ and ‘ψ’-epistemic — hence Chris Fuch’s wonderfully cruel term (in
conversation) for those who take the ontic view: “ψ-ontologists”.) This terminology, though,
suggests a particular reading of probability as a quantification of our ignorance, which I want
to avoid being committed to.
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straightforward probabilistic reading of the quantum state breaks down. Partly
this is because the democracy of bases in Hilbert space allow a multitude of
ways of expressing a state as a superposition of eigenstates: is the spin state
α |+z〉+ β |−z〉 (2)
to be interpreted as a probabilistic mixture of a particle with z-spin up and a
particle with z-spin down, or as a different probabilistic mixture of x-spin up
and x-spin down? (Or, somehow, mysteriously, as both at once?) But more
crucially, the probabilistic reading simply fails to make sense of interference
phenomena. Suppose that we set up a Mach-Zender interferometer, in which a
beam of (say) photons is split into left(L) and right(R) beams by a half-silvered
mirror and then re-interfered by means of another such mirror, and the resultant
beams are fed into two detectors, A and B. We can easily establish, by blocking
the R beam, that if the photon is originally in the L beam, it has a 50% chance
of ending up at detector A after the second half-silvered mirror, and a 50%
chance of ending up at detector B. We can easily establish that the same is
true if it is originally in the R beam. But in that case, which beam it is in makes
no difference to the outcome probabilities, so any probabilistic mixture of the
two possibilities should lead to a 50% chance of each of the two results. And
of course, this is not what happens: depending on the relative phase of the two
beams, any outcome from 100%A to 100%B is possible.5
The two objections are related, of course. Interference phenomena can oc-
cur in quantum mechanics precisely because amplitudes have phases as well as
magnitude. The probabilistic reading of a quantum state like (1) or (2) inter-
prets the magnitudes of the amplitudes α and β as probabilities, but provides
no interpretation of their phases. On this reading, replacing α with α exp(−iθ)
should have no physical significance — but of course, doing so not only has
“significance”, it has empirically detectable consequences.
This provides an alternative way to state the measurement problem:
We cannot consistently understand the state space of quantum the-
ory either as a space of physical states, or as a space of probability
distributions. Instead, we have to use one interpretation for micro-
scopic physics and another for macroscopic physics. Furthermore,
both the point at which we have to transition between the physi-
cal and probabilistic interpretation, and the basis with respect to
which the probabilistic interpretation is to be specified, are defined
only in an approximate, rough-and-ready way, which seems to make
5Nor will it do to say “quantum probabilities just behave differently from classical ones”.
The point of the argument is that we cannot explain the observed phenomena allowing the
two “possibilities” to influence one another. But if something that can have a dynamical effect
on a real thing doesn’t thereby count as real, we lose our grip on reality. (Cf discussions in
Deutsch (1997, chapter 4), Wallace (2011, chapter 10), or Anandan and Brown (1995).) The
bottom line is that a microscopic superposition cannot be understood as merely probabilistic:
both terms in the superposition represent physical features of the world. But if the same is
true for the Schro¨dinger-cat state, the paradoxical nature of that state is not alleviated by the
supposedly “probabilistic” reading.
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essential use of terms like “macroscopic” which have no place in a
fundamental physical theory.
It also provides a ready way to understand the various strategies that have
been proposed to resolve the measurement problem. Firstly, there are the at-
tempts to solve the problem, by replacing quantum theory by a new theory
which can be understood in a consistent way. There are two basic strategies:
Hidden-variable theories These theories hold on to the dynamics of unitary
quantum theory, but remove the probabilistic interpretation of the quan-
tum state. Instead, some new physical entities are introduced, which are
dynamically influenced by the quantum state but not vice versa. Prob-
ability is then introduced via a probability distribution over these “hid-
den variables”. The paradigm example is the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave
theory, also called Bohmian mechanics,6 in which the quantum state is
supplemented by a collection of point particles whose collective evolution
is determined by the quantum state. (So-called ‘modal interpretations’7
also fit this category.)
Dynamical-collapse theories These theories8 try to make sense of the tran-
sition from a physical to a probabilistic reading of the quantum state not
as an interpretative shift but as an objective physical process. This is gen-
erally done by introducing some version of the Projection Postulate that
objectively removes macroscopic superpositions, and does so in a proba-
bilistic manner. According to dynamical-collapse theories, the quantum
state is always to be interpreted physically and its stochastic evolution
deviates from the deterministic Schro¨dinger equation in certain circum-
stances — but it does so in such a way that the resultant probabilities are
very close to those defined by the probabilistic reading of unitary quantum
mechanics.
Secondly, there are the attempts to dissolve the problem, by finding a consis-
tent interpretation of unitary quantum theory. There are only two real options
here:
The quantum state is always probabilistic This approach tries to inter-
pret quantum state space as systematically like the space of classical
probability distributions. This has proved extremely difficult, though, for
essentially the reasons given above: interference phenomena don’t seem
to be understandable as probabilistic phenomena. More rigorously, the
theoretical results of Bell (1966), Kochen and Specker (1967), and Glea-
son (1957), make it clear that any such strategy will have the apparently
pathological feature of contextuality.9 For this reason, most10 adherents of
6See Cushing, Fine, and Goldstein (1996) and references therein.
7See Dieks and Vermaas (1998) and references therein.
8Examples include the GRW theory (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (1986); see
Bassi and Ghirardi (2003) for discussion) and proposals due to Penrose (1989); cf also
Philip Stamp’s discussion in this volume).
9For detailed discussion, see, e. g. , Redhead (1987).
10Not all: Spekkens (2007) is a counter-example.
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this strategy have given up on the idea of interpreting the “probabilities”
as probabilities of any microphysical even, and just read them directly
as probabilities of measurement outcomes, treated as primitive. That is,
they fall back on an instrumentalist reading of quantum theory. (For a
clearly articulated example, see Fuchs and Peres (2000).)
The quantum state is always physical This approach, most famously as-
sociated with the name of Hugh Everett (1957), tries to interpret quantum
state space as systematically like classical phase space. This deals straight-
forwardly with the problem of microscopic interference, but struggles with
the problem of macroscopic superpositions. If Schro¨dinger-cat states like
1 are to be understood as physical states, what physical situation are they
representing? The only coherent answer seems to be: a situation with
two independently-evolving cats, one alive and one dead. But what jus-
tifies this interpretation, and where do the probabilities enter the theory,
if they are not to be added directly through either a probabilistic reading
of the state, or through additional hidden variables, or through stochastic
dynamics?11
However, once again it will be useful not to consider the conceptual question
of how to make sense of a state space that seems sometimes to be a space of
physical states and sometimes a space of probability distributions, but to ask,
more practically, how it is that we sometimes get away with treating the state
space as a space of probability distributions, given that fundamentally that
interpretation does not seem consistent.
3 The role of decoherence
Let us consider more carefully just when the probabilistic interpretation can be
consistently applied. Recall that it is interference that blocks a probabilistic
interpretation at the microscopic scale; if a probabilistic interpretation can be
applied at any scale, then, it must be because interference phenomena can be
neglected.
This, of course, is precisely the question which decoherence theory is de-
signed to answer. In the following, I apply the environment-induced deco-
herence framework12 used by Zeh (1993), Zurek (1991) et al ; essentially the
same conclusions, though, can be derived in the decoherent-histories framework
(See, e. g. ,Gell-Mann and Hartle (1993), Griffiths (1993), Halliwell (1998); see
also my discussion in chapter 3 of Wallace (2011)).
Firstly: suppose that the physical system we are considering has a Hilbert
space H which can be decomposed as
H = HM ⊗HE , (3)
11For detailed discussion of the Everett interpretation, see Saunders et al(2010) or
Wallace (2011).
12See Joos et al (2003) and references therein for a review of this framework.
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where HM is the Hilbert space of the degrees of freedom that interest us —
say, the centre-of-mass degrees of freedom of a macroscopic object, or the low-
momentum vibrational modes of an extended solid — and HE is the Hilbert
space of all the other degrees of freedom that interact with those that interest us.
HM is normally said to represent the “system”, and HE the “environmental”,
degrees of freedom, but it’s important to recognise that the “environment” need
not be spatially external: for the extended solid, for instance, HE might be the
Hilbert space of vibrational modes above some momentum cutoff.
Suppose also that there is some basis {|z〉}, ofHM , labelled by some (discrete
or continuous) variable z, with the following property: the state
(∫
dz α(z) |z〉
)
⊗ |ψ〉 , (4)
(where the integral sign schematically denotes summation or integration over z,
as appropriate) evolves rapidly, for fairly generic |ψ〉 ∈ HE , to∫
dz α(z) |z〉⊗|ψ(z)〉 , (5)
where (i) ‘rapidly’ means ‘rapidly as compared to the dynamical timescales of
the system’s own dynamics, and (ii) 〈ψ(z)|ψ(z′)〉 ≃ 0 unless z ≃ z′. Effectively,
dynamics like this consists of the environment ‘measuring’ the system state.
The classic example has {|z〉} as a wave-packet basis, reasonably localised in
both centre-of-mass position and momentum. Since the system-environment
interactions are local, two wave-packets with significantly distinct locations will
cause significantly different evolution of the environment. And two wave-packets
with significantly different momentum will swiftly evolve into two wave-packets
with significantly different position. (Handling this case carefully requires us to
deal with the fact that wavepackets form an overcomplete basis; I’ll ignore this
issue for simplicity.)
If this occurs, we will say that the system is decohered by the environment,
with respect to the {|z〉} basis.
Now suppose we want to apply the probability interpretation with respect to
the {|z〉} basis: that is, we want to treat a state like (5) as having probability13
|α(z)|2 of having whatever physical property (call it Z) that z is supposed to
represent (some given centre-of-mass position and/or momentum, say). If the
density operator of the system at time t is ρ(t), then we have
Pr(Z = z, t) = 〈z| ρ(t) |z〉 (6)
where Pr(Z = z, t) is the probability at time t of the system having Z = z.
For this really to be interpretable as a probability, though, its evolution needs
to be free from interference effects: that is, it needs to evolve like a probability
function. So: let Pr(Z = z′, t′;Z = z, t) be the probability14 that the system
13Or probability density, if z is a continuous variable.
14Again, this should be interpreted as a probability density if z is continuous.
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has Z = z′ at time t′, given that it has Z = z at time t. Then the standard
laws of probability tell us that
Pr(Z = z′, t′) =
∫
dz Pr(Z = z′, t′|Z = z, t)× Pr(Z = z, t). (7)
The dynamics will have this form iff Pr(Z = z′, t′) is a linear functional of
Pr(Z = z, t); that is, if 〈z| ρ(t′) |z〉 (considered as a function of z) is a linear
functional of 〈z| ρ(t) |z〉.
In general, this will not be the case. Assuming we can write down au-
tonomous dynamics for ρ in the first place, then of course the overall linearity
of unitary dynamics implies that ρ(t′) is a linear functional of ρ(t). But in gen-
eral, 〈z| ρ(t′) |z〉 depends not only on diagonal terms of ρ(t) like 〈z| ρ(t) |z〉, but
on off-diagonal terms like 〈z| ρ(t) |w〉.
However, in the case we are considering, the interaction with the environ-
ment guarantees that off-diagonal terms in ρ are suppressed, and suppressed on
timescales much quicker than those which characterise the dynamics of the sys-
tem itself. In this situation, then, the effective evolution equation for ρ reduces
to an evolution equation specifically for the diagonal elements of ρ in the {|z〉}
basis.
Let’s sum up. If the total system we are studying can be decomposed into
“system” and “environment” degrees of freedom, such that for some basis {|z〉}
of the system, the system is decohered by the basis with respect to that basis,
then we can consistently treat the total system as a probabilistic mixture of
states like |z〉⊗|ψ(z)〉.
Furthermore, we have excellent reason — from general physical arguments,
from specific models, and increasingly from experiment — to think that the
macroscopic degrees of freedom of a system are decohered by the residual degrees
of freedom with respect to a wave-packet basis for those macroscopic degrees
of freedom. So macroscopic systems can consistently be treated as probabilistic
mixture of states with different — but definite — values of those macroscopic
degrees of freedom.
Note that nothing in this analysis relies on the environment being in any
way discarded, except in the pragmatic sense that we’re not terribly interested
in what it’s doing. The total system continues to evolve unitarily, but by virtue
of the particular form of that unitary dynamics, it can consistently be given a
probabilistic interpretation with respect to its macroscopic degrees of freedom.
Note also that it is the dynamical aspects of decoherence that are important
here (a point also stressed by Zurek(1994, 1998)). The rapid suppression of
the off-diagonal elements of the density operator, which is usually taken as the
signature of decoherence, is significant not in itself but because it implies that
the dynamics of the diagonal elements must be probabilistically interpretable.
(The decoherent-histories framework makes this more explicit: in that frame-
work, the possibility of interpreting the system’s evolution probabilistically is
definitional of decoherence.)
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4 Decoherence and the measurement problem
Decoherence, then, explains why the measurement problem is a philosophical
rather than a practical problem. Given the ubiquity of decoherence, the strategy
of applying the probability interpretation of the state to decohered systems (and
to the basis with respect to which the decoherence occurs) will not actually give
us contradictory predictions — at least, not to the levels of accuracy which
we have any hope of probing empirically. Those readers inclined towards the
so-called “shut up and calculate interpretation”, therefore, can stop reading
now. For the rest, we should now return to the previous taxonomy of strategies
for solving, or dissolving, the problem, and see how they fare in the light of
decoherence.
We begin with the strategies for solving the problem: the dynamical-collapse
and hidden-variable strategies. Recall that dynamical-collapse strategies effec-
tively turn the shift from a physical to a probability reading of the quantum
state into a dynamical process, while hidden-variable strategies effectively hold
on to a physical reading of the quantum state and add additional dynamical
variables over which the probabilities are defined.
At first sight, both strategies are made straightforward by decoherence. We
can fairly straightforwardly specify a dynamical collapse theory by stipulating
that superpositions of states in the decoherence-preferred basis spontaneously
collapse, with collapse probabilities given by the probability rule; we can fairly
straightforwardly specify a hidden-variable theory by treating the variable that
labels the decoherence-preferred basis as a hidden variable and stipulating that
the probability distribution over that variable is given by the probability rule.
Neither of these recipes completely specifies the theory in question (how quickly
does collapse occur? what dynamics govern the hidden variables, and does it
ensure that the probabilities remain in line with the quantum predictions after
the initial stipulation?) but — it might seem — the hard work has been done.
Unfortunately, things are not so simple, for a straightforward reason: de-
coherence is not a precisely defined process. We can see this in several related
ways:
1. Decoherence suppresses interference only approximately. Interference be-
tween alternative “possibilities” is far too low to be experimentally de-
tectable — which is another way to say that to within the limits of experi-
mental accuracy, the probability interpretation gives consistent predictions
— but it is not zero.
2. The basis picked out by decoherence is itself only approximately given. In
the standard examples, for instance, we might specify it as “a wave-packet,
not too localised in position or momentum”. But “not too localised” is
scarcely a precise criterion; nor is there anything particularly privileged
about the Gaussians usually used for wave-packets, save their mathemat-
ical convenience. Criteria like Zurek’s “predictability sieve” (Zurek 1994)
can be used to pick a particular choice of basis, but these have more a
pragmatic than a fundamental character.
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3. The analysis of decoherence I gave above relies on a certain decomposi-
tion of the total Hilbert space into “system” and “environment” degrees
of freedom. Varying that decomposition will vary the probability rules
defined by the decoherence process. Granted, any remotely sensible de-
composition can be expected to give essentially similar results, but “re-
motely sensible” and “essentially similar” are not really the kind of terms
we’d like to see in the specification of a fundamental theory. But Dowker
and Kent (1996) have provided strong arguments (in the rather different
mathematical framework of decoherent histories) that the mere criterion
that the probability calculus applies to a given decoherence basis, divorced
from other considerations, is overwhelmingly too weak to pick out a unique
basis, even approximately.
These observations all stem from the same feature of decoherence: that it
is a high-level, dynamical process, dependent on details of the dynamics of the
world and even on contingent features of a given region of the world. It is not the
kind of thing that can be captured in the mathematical language of microscopic
physics.
Note that this is not to say that decoherence is not a real, objective process.
Science in general, and physics in particular, is absolutely replete with real,
objective processes that occur because of high-level dynamical effects. Pretty
much any regularity in chemistry, biology, psychology, . . . has to have this char-
acter, in fact. But emergent processes like this don’t have a place in the axioms
of fundamental physics, precisely because they emerge from those axioms them-
selves.15
An analogy: it has been well understood for many years that particles —
whether in relativistic quantum field theory, or in condensed matter physics
— are themselves not fundamental. The particle spectrum of a quantum field
theory is determined by the dynamical features of the theory, and in general
it is determined only approximately, and in a way that varies according to the
contingent features of the regime which interests us. (In some situations, we
analyse quantum chromodynamics in terms of quarks; in others, in terms of
protons and neutrons; not only the masses and charges of the particles, but
which particles we use in the first place, vary according to the energy levels at
which the theory is analysed.)
Adrian Kent puts it rather well (in a slightly different context):
It’s certainly true that phase information loss is a dynamical process
which needs no axiomatic formulation. However, this is irrelevant to
our very simple point: no preferred basis can arise, from the dynam-
ics or from anything else, unless some basis selection rule is given.
Of course, [one] can attempt to frame such a rule in terms of a dy-
namical quantity - for example, some measure of phase information
loss. But an explicit, precise rule is needed. (Kent 1990)
15Emergence has a long and tangled history in philosophy of science; see, e. g. , Butter-
field (2011a, 2011b), and references therein, for details. In physics, perhaps the most influen-
tial discussion of recent years has been Anderson (1972).
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But if decoherence cannot be used to define a set of hidden variables, or a
collapse law, nonethleless it serves to constrain both concepts. For if the collapse
rule does not cause collapse onto a basis that is approximately decohered, it will
fail to reproduce the experimental predictions of quantum mechanics; likewise, if
a probability function over the values of the hidden variables does not determine
a probability function over the decoherence-selected basis, the hidden variables
will not allow us to recover the empirical predictions of quantum theory.
In the case of nonrelativistic quantum theory, this is unprcoblematic. The
decoherence-preferred basis is basically a coarse-graining of the position basis, so
a collapse rule which collapses the system onto wavepackets fairly concentrated
around a particular centre-of-mass position, or a choice of position as the hidden
variable, will do nicely. And indeed, we find that the main examples of non-
relativistic collapse and hidden-variable theories — the GRW theory and Bohm’s
theory — do indeed select position in this way.
It is crucial to note what makes this possible. Position has a dual role in
non-relativistic quantum theory: it is at one and the same time (a) one of the
fundamental microphysical variables in terms of which the theory is defined,
and (b) such that a coarse-grained version of it is preferred by the high-level,
dynamical, emergent process of decoherence. As such, it is possible to formu-
late modifications or supplements to non-relativistic quantum theory that are
both precisely defined in terms of the microphysical variables used to formulate
quantum mechanics, and appropriately aligned with themacrophysical variables
picked out by decoherence.16
Unhappily for modificatory strategies, there does not appear to be a variable
in extant relativistic quantum theory — in QED, say, or in the Standard Model
— that manages to play this dual role. In the fermionic sector, decoherence
seems to prefer states of definite particle number — and, as we have already
seen, “particle number” is itself a dynamically emergent concept, determined by
the complex details of renormalisation theory and dependent, to a considerable
degree, on the energy levels at which we wish to study the systems of interest to
us. In the bosonic sector — at least where electromagnetism is concerned — de-
coherence seems instead to select out coherent states (Anglin and Zurek 1996),
but these are coherent states defined with respect to the effective field oper-
ators governing the system at low energies. In neither case is there any re-
motely straightforward definition of the decoherence-preferred basis in terms of
the quantities used to formulate the quantum field theory at the microphysi-
cal level. Indeed, it is a commonplace of renormalisation theory17 that these
variables are largely hidden from view at the level of observable phenomena.
For this reason, I suspect — if it is accepted that modifications of quan-
tum theory should not themselves be stated in a way which makes essential
16Incidentally, this is what makes testing dynamical collapse theories so difficult: the fact
that they must succeed in reproducing the empirical predictions of quanutum theory in normal
circumstances pretty much guarantees that it will be very difficult to distinguish genuine
collapse from mere decoherence. (Difficult, but not impossible; see Stamp, this volume.)
17See Peskin and Schroeder (1995), or any other modern textbook on quantum field theory,
for technical details and references.
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reference to dynamically emergent and high-level features of the theory — that
the prospects of solving the measurement problem in the relativistic domain by
modifying quantum theory are dim. It is notable that, to my knowledge, there
is no dynamical-collapse theory even purporting to be applicable to relativis-
tic quantum theory in the presence of interactions,18 and those hidden-variable
theories that have been proposed in the relativistic domain19 are largely silent
about renormalisation.
Turning to the strategies for dissolving the measurement problem, recall that
there are again two: treat the wavefunction as always probabilistic, or treat
it as always physical. The former strategy makes essentially no contact with
decoherence: the point of decoherence (as I have presented it here) is to give an
account of when a probabilistic reading of the wavefunction is consistent, but
the probabilistic strategy treats it as always consistent. It does so, in general,
by retreating from any attempt to interpret the probabilities as probabilities of
anything except measurement outcomes.
This strategy, in effect, is a retreat to the idea that measurement is a primi-
tive. Insofar as that makes sense, it suffices to resolve the puzzles of interference
without any concern about decoherence (as it would have to: after all, it has to
explain why the probabilistic reading is always possible, even in situations where
decoherence is negligible). But, as I have alluded to earlier, it does not make
sense, so far as I can see, partly on philosophical grounds but largely on the
straightforward grounds that experimental physicists, and theorists who study
experiment, cannot treat measurement as primitive but invariably fall back on
the need to analyse it, using quantum theory itself.
To be fair, this objection has received at least some attention from advocates
of the strategy (for recent examples, see Peres (1993) and Fuchs (2002)).20 I
leave it to readers to judge for themselves whether these responses really do
justice to physical practice. It is worth pointing out, though, that in general its
advocates tend to work in quantum information, a field whose raison d’etre is to
abstract away the messy details of quantum-mechanical processes and look at
their abstract structure. This strategy has been remarkably successful, yielding
deep insights about quantum theory that would not have come easily if we
had kept the messy details in play; for all that, it’s possible to worry that some
quantum-information approaches to the measurement problem mistake the map
for the territory.
The final strategy is Everett’s: treat the quantum state as always giving
the physical state of the system. If decoherence can contribute directly to any
(dis)solution to the measurement problem, it is here. For we have seen that
18The nearest thing to such a theory is Tumulka’s theory (Tumulka 2006), which is explicitly
formulated for a multi-particle theory, on the assumption that there are no interactions. It was,
of course, precisely the need to incorporate interactions that drove the pioneers of relativistic
quantum mechanics to field theory.
19The main examples are Durr et al (2004, 2005), who take the hidden variables to be parti-
cle positions; Struyve and Westman (2007), who take them to be bosonic field configurations,
and Colin and Struyve (2007), who take them to be local fermion-number densities.
20And, as I mentioned earlier, it is not universally accepted that only a primitivist view of
measurement can justify the strategy.
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decoherence is an emergent process; what it tells us, interpreted as Everett
suggests, is that even if the Universe is fundamentally a unitarily evolving whole,
at the emergent level it has the structure of a probability distribution over
states each of which describes approximately classical goings on. There is no
mechanism by which one of those states is preferred (is ‘actual’, if you like) and
the others are mere possibilities: at the fundamental level, all are components
in a single, unitarily-evolving state, and no one is preferred over another. (Any
such mechanism would amount to a dynamical-collapse theory, as discussed
previously.) But at the emergent level, each term evolves independently of
the others; furthermore, their mod-squared amplitudes behave as if they were
probabilities.
Does this mean that decoherence suffices to solve the measurement problem,
provided that we understand the quantum state as a physical state as Everett
proposed? The answer turns on two problems:
1. (The ontological problem): For something to be a collection of quasi-
classical worlds, does it suffice for it to have the structure of a collection
of quasi-classical worlds — or is more needed?
2. (The probability problem): For something to be a probability measure
over a set of quasi-classical worlds, does it suffice for it to have the structure
of a probability measure over a collection of quasi-classical worlds — or is
more needed?
Space does not permit an extensive engagement with these questions. My
own view21 is that neither problem is truly problematic. But it is notable that
both problems are essentially philosophical in nature: in the light of decoher-
ence, if an Everettian solution to the measurement problem is to be rejected
then it will have to be for subtle philosophical reasons rather than any struc-
tural deficiency in quantum theory.
5 Conclusion
In twenty-first-century physics, the “measurement problem” is best understood,
not as an illegitimate intrusion of a primitive “measurement” postulate into
physics, but as a conceptual incoherence in our interpretation of quantum states:
it seems impossible to understand the macroscopic predictions of quantum me-
chanics without interpreting the state probabilistically, yet because of interfer-
ence, quantum states cannot systematically be thought of as probability distri-
butions over physical states of affairs. We can attempt to resolve that incoher-
ence either by philosophical methods (thinking hard about how to understand
quantum states so as to come up with a non-incoherent way) or by modifying
the physics (replacing quantum mechanics with some new theory that doesn’t
even prima facie lead to the conceptual incoherence).
21Developed in full in Wallace (2011); for earlier versions, see Wallace (2003, 2010a) in the
first case, and Wallace (2007, 2010b) in the second. For further discussion — on both sides
— see Saunders et al (2010) and references therein.
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Decoherence explains why it is that quantum theory nonetheless works in
practice: it explains why interference does not, in practice spoil the probabilis-
tic interpretation at the macro level. But because decoherence is an emergent,
high-level, approximately-defined, dynamical process, there is no hope of incor-
porating it into any modification of quantum theory at the fundamental level.
Decoherence does, however, act as a significant constraint on such modifications
—a constraint which, in the case of relativistic quantum field theory, is likely
to be exceedingly hard to satisfy.
Decoherence could, however, play a role in a solution to the measurement
problem which leaves the equations of quantum theory alone and treats the ob-
jective macroscopic reality we see around us as itself an emergent phenomenon.
Such a strategy is committed to the claim that, at the fundamental level, the
quantum state continues to describe the physical state of the world: it is, there-
fore, ultimately Everett’s strategy. Decoherence finds its natural role in the
measurement problem as the process which explains why quantum mechanics,
interpreted as Everett advocates, can be fundamentally deterministic and non-
classical, but emergently classical. It does not, however, in any way blunt the
metaphysically shocking aspect of Everett’s proposal: no one quasi-classical
branch is singled out as real; all are equally part of the underlying quantum
reality.
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